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Abstract 
 
In this this thesis, we address the problem related to security in a composition of web services, mainly 
in a BPEL process. This problem emerges due to the monopolization of security at the web service 
side which causes an enormous overhead when running a process that orchestrates between multiple 
services. Furthermore, BPEL suffers from a lack of modularity for modeling cross-cutting concerns, 
thus any changes or modication to the process is a tedious and cumbersome, not to mention the need 
to deactivate the process throughout the modication phase. Thus, our thesis is dedicated to the 
introduction of a mutli-layer framework for the enforcement of security for web services. This 
approach is based on a synergy between XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) 
security policies, Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) and composition of web services (BPEL).  
 
This synergy is achieved through the elaboration of a dedicated language called AspectBPEL. The 
elaborated AspectBPEL language allows specifying security policies as separate components, namely, 
aspects. These aspects are weaved systematically in the BPEL (Business Process Execution Language) 
process for the sake of activating the security policies at runtime on specic join points.  
 
In addition, our approach allows specifying the XACML security policies that are used to determine 
pointcuts in a BPEL process where security is needed. Subsequently, a BPEL ow with the needed 
security is generated into security AspectBPEL aspects to be weaved in the aforementioned process. 
The centralization of security at the process level consists on the use of a separate trust authority that 
adopts an XACML infrastructure.  
 
The main contributions of our approach are: (1) Describing dynamic security policies using a standard 
language XACML, (2) generating automatically the BPEL aspects of the XACML policies, (3) 
separating the business and security concerns of composite web services, and hence developing them 
separately (4) allowing the modication of the dynamic security features and web services 
composition at run time to integrate, remove and/or update security mechanisms, (5) providing 
modularity for modeling cross-cutting concerns between web services. (6) centralizing and updating 
the security measurements at the BPEL side and (7) providing a language and a framework that is fully 
operational and compatible with any BPEL process regardless of the adopted development 
environment. 
 
The feasibility and usability of the proposed framework have been veried using two real life case 
studies: an Online Purchase System (OPS) and a Flight Reservation System (FS). Finally, 
experimental results and performance analysis are presented to evaluate the proposed framework. 
 
Keywords: Web Services, BPEL, Security, XACML, Aspects Oriented Programming. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivations and Problem Statement
Security is becoming a hot topic in academia and industry. In this context, customers are
expecting security to be delivered out of the box, even on programs that were not designed
with security in mind. The challenge is even greater when legacy systems must be adapted
to network/web environments, which is the case for web services.
Web services technology has been successful in making business applications available
through the internet to a large number of users. It does not just widen the broad of appli-
cations accessibility but it is also a catalysis for collaboration between several distributed
applications through the composition concept. Nevertheless, the successful deployment of
this technology cannot hide the security breaches and threats [6] that web services can be
exposed to. Enforcement of web services security is one of the most important duties, that
the research community has to perform. This means the design and development of con-
cepts, processes and tools that help in making web services protected from malicious users.
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Instances of these security features can be the enforcement of user authentication, access
control and data confidentiality in web services.
Conventionally, security measures were embedded statically in the design/code of a
web service. This is a problem because, when the security policies and/or verification
strategy change, the developer has to go back to the design/code of the web services and
update them accordingly. This renders the web services unresponsive during modification.
In this context, several standard languages were proposed to enforce web services secu-
rity policies in a dynamic fashion, among which we find the: Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) [19], WS-Security [8] and XACML [23].
XACML, SAML , WS-Policy and other standard security languages emerged to offer
a standard and dynamic authentication and access control features for web services . In
other words, they are concerned with providing outbound message-level security for web
services in order to ensure secure communication with external partners.
With the emergence of these standard policy languages, the concern of implementing
security at the web service side is alleviated. However, the problem arises at the BPEL
level when several distributed and/or independent web services are composed together in
a BPEL process to form a complex system. BPEL provides orchestration between several
web services that are refereed to as "partners". In the current form of BPEL use, BPEL is
only given the responsibility of business level orchestration, while message-level security is
left to each individual web service to deal with when invoked by the process. Consequently,
when a client invokes a BPEL process, which invokes on his behalf every web service in
the process. Thus, the security measures (e.g. authentication, access control, credentials
verification, etc.) of the same user will be executed at each web service. This will affect
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enormously the performance of the BPEL process due to the overhead of running the se-
curity verification at each invoke. Moreover, placing security at the process level requires
knowledge of the web services’s security requirements which is practically unavailable.
In parallel, with the use of the current BPEL, there is a lack of modularity for mod-
eling cross-cutting concerns and inadequate support for changing the composition at run
time. Any change in the environment, addition or removal of partner web services requires
static and dynamic adaptation. In other words, if a BPEL runtime process change is re-
quired, we have to stop the running process, change the needed web service(s), modify the
composition, and then restart. Such a mechanism is cumbersome, error-prone and tedious.
1.2 Objectives
This thesis’s main contribution is the elaboration of a framework for the systematic enforce-
ment of web services security. Our framework offers an elegant and easy to use language, in
addition to a compiler to ensure the correctness of the syntax and a weaver for the modular
integration of security. More specifically, the objective of our approach are to:
 Address the problem of composite web services security and develop a methodology
for the systematic integration of security at the process level.
 Develop a dedicated language for the integration of web services security in a mod-
ular fashion.
 Allow the modification of web services compositions at run time to integrate, remove
and/or update security mechanisms.
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 Implement a framework that allows the compilation and weaving of security aspects
in composite web services.
1.3 Approach Overview and Contributions
We propose in this thesis a new framework for the dynamic enforcement of web services
security. The proposed framework spans over a new aspect oriented language called As-
pectBPEL.
In addition, we describe in details the AspectBPEL compiler and its development en-
vironment. The AspectBPEL language, allows to specify the security concerns in separate
components called aspects. These aspects can then be weaved using the AspectBPEL com-
piler into the specified BPEL process where the security features are activated at runtime
on selected join points. Such approach reduces the security verification at the web ser-
vices side and provide less security checks at the process level. Furthermore our proposed
framework is not only limited to weaving security aspects, it can also be used to weave
other functional and non-functional requirements. In the sequel, we present the additional
contributions of our new framework.
Moreover, we elaborated an extended approach for the systematic integration of secu-
rity at the process level using a standard policy language. Our methodology consists of
adopting a trust enforcer at the process side that incorporates an XACML infrastructure for
authentication and authorization.
In the following, we provide details about the aforementioned contributions.
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1.3.1 Aspect-Oriented BPEL Framework for the Dynamic Enforce-
ment of Web Services Security
The main contribution of our work is designing a language for the dynamic integration of
web services security. This language is based on aspect oriented programming to allow
modular weaving of security aspects at the process level. Thus, it allows the separation
between business and security concerns and thus, developing them separately. Our frame-
work offers modularity for modeling cross-cutting concerns, such as security, logging and
performance monitoring. The following are the related achievements:
1. Elaborate an approach to separate the business and security concerns of composite
web services, and hence developing them separately.
2. Elaborate a language and a framework that is fully operational and compatible with
any BPEL process regardless of the adopted development environments (e.g. Eclipse,
NetBeans, Oracle).
3. Develop a compiler to ensure the correctness of the syntax and a weaver for the
modular integration of cross-cutting concerning.
4. Build a case study to prove the efficiency and effectiveness of our framework.
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1.3.2 Extended XACML-AspectBPEL Approach for Composite Web
Services Security
The main contribution of this work is the elaboration of an extended approach for BPEL
security. Our approach is based on a synergy between XACML, Aspect-Oriented Program-
ming (AOP) and composition of web services. XACML offers the capability of describing
the security policies required for a system, while AOP allows to specify the security con-
cerns in separate components called aspects. Our approach is based on the use of a separate
trust enforcer, where each partner web service deploys its security policies. At the BPEL
side, AspectBPEL aspects will be integrated at selective joint points in order to provide
process level security to replace activity-based security caused by the monopolization of
security at the web service side.
The main added value to the proposed framework, in addition to the aforementioned
achievements presented in section 1.3.1 are :
1. Avoid activity-based security and replace it with a process-level security.
2. Identify selective joint-points for the integration of security aspects in order to avoid
unnecessary calls to the XACML components.
3. Describe the security policies using a standard policy language (XACML).
4. Generate BPEL aspects conformed with XACML policies.
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1.4 Thesis Organization
The remaining of the thesis is organized as following:
In Chapter 2 we present related works done in the area of web services security and
aspect oriented programming. Moreover, we give an introduction on the concepts of web
services technology, web services orchestration and Aspect Oriented Programming. We
also provide an overview on information security, various security standards and method-
ologies developed for web services, particularly WS-Security and XACML.
In Chapter 3 we give a thorough description of the elaborated AspectBPEL language,
moreover, we discuss in details the AspectBPEL framework in addition to its compiler
and weaving engine. To better illustrate the usage of the AspectBPEL grammar, we give
an illustrative example with a case study on a "System for Online Purchase". Finally, we
conclude the chapter with the results of the performance analysis that proves the appropri-
ateness of our AspectBPEL language for the integration of security aspects at the process
level. In addition, we present an analysis of the runtime of our compiler and weaving
engine.
In Chapter 4, we present an extension to our AspectBPEL framework that supports the
generation of security aspects from a standard policy language: XACML. The XACML-
AspectBPEL framework offers the ability to generate security aspects from XACML poli-
cies. It also adopts a methodology for the systematic selection and weaving of security
behavior at selective join points. We also give an illustrative example of a Flight Reser-
vation System and conclude the chapter with the results of the performance analysis to
back-up our methodology and demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.
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In Chapter 5, we summarize briefly the achievements and contributions of this thesis,
provide concluding remarks, state the plans for future work, and present the list of publica-
tions derived from this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background & Related Work
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we provide an overview of all the concepts that compose the components of
our framework. Our multi-layer framework is based on a synergy between AOP, XACML
, web services and composite web services. First, we will provide an introduction to web
services. We will use an example of a Car Manufacturer to better illustrate the use of web
services and the advantages of this paradigm. Next, we will explain the concept of BPEL,
a business process execution language that allows the orchestration of web services for the
composition of complex processes. Moreover, since our thesis is mainly concerned with the
topic of security, we will provide a definition of the main security requirements in the area
of computer and information security, then provide an introduction of the current security
standards applied to web services. The essence of our framework is ensured through the use
of Aspect Oriented Programming, thus we will end our background work, with introduction
about AOP. Finally, we will conclude this chapter with the related work in the area of web
9
services security.
2.2 Web Services
Web Services are the latest evolution in distributed computing. This technology allows
access to services over network through a combination of Extensible Markup Language
(XML),Web Service Description Language (WSDL), Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)
and Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI). While it may seem very
similar to client/server applications, web services don’t offer a GUI to the client and its
functionality focuses on sending and processing data in a peer-to-peer fashion. They have
also gained a lot of popularity for being both platform and language independent. So what
makes web services so popular? To better illustrate the glam of web services, consider the
following example: Let’s say you are Ford, the big company that sells cars. Ford has its
own website that the customers can access. On the other side, there are a lot of car deal-
ers that also sell Ford cars through their own websites such as caranddriver.com. These
car dealers definitely present a huge monetary gain to Ford, and they help raise its sales.
However, these brokers use their own database to get the prices of Ford cars. Thus, in case
Ford decreases the Price of its Ford Focus, these car dealers won’t know about the price
drop which would affect the business of Ford. To help the accuracy of these websites, Ford
can grant access to its database by exposing an API that the brokers can invoke and get the
exact prices on the fly. Thus, web services consist of exposing APIs that clients can access
over a network. These clients need only to know the location of the web service which can
be fetched from the UDDI.
10
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Figure 1: Web Service Process
The UDDI is the discovery service that keeps a list of available services and their port
addresses. Upon receiving the port address from the UDDI, the user needs to know how to
invoke the web service. For this purpose, every web service comes with a WSDL. WSDL
files are similar to a manual that comes with a system/machine that tells you what kind of
features the system/machine offers and how to operate them. Similarly, a WSDL file shows
the list of operations that the web service offers, the parameters that each operation needs
and the data structure it returns. This XML-Based language is composed of 7 elements:
 Types : Gives the Type of exchanged messages.
 Messages : Defines the request and response messages for each operation, in addition
to the elements that compose each message. These elements can be strings, integers,
11
boolean, date & time, float, double and hexbinary.
 PortTypes : Advertises the list of functions that the web service offers with their
respective inputs and outputs.
 Binding : Specifies a link between <portType> and a protocol (SOAP, HTTP...).
 Service : Indicates the port address of each link
 Port : Indicates the endpoint of the web service.
 Operation : Gives a description of the operation available in the port.
SOAP is a message level protocol for exchanging structured information with web ser-
vices. It is an XML-Based language composed of a SOAP envelope that encapsulates a
SOAP header and a SOAP body. SOAP gained a lot of popularity because it offers exten-
sibility, like WS-Security. Neutrality because it is supported by various transport protocol
such as: SMTP, HTTP and TCP. It is also programming language independent.
2.3 WS-BPEL
WS-BPEL is an oasis standard executable language for the creation of business processes.
These processes are based on the orchestration between several web services to achieve a
business goal. For instance, you can create a BPEL process that first invokes a web service
to get the weather based on a given zip code, and then invokes another web service that
suggests activities to be done based on the weather (shopping if it’s rainy or a trip to the
beach if it’s sunny).
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Figure 2: BPEL Overview
BPEL ( Business Process Execution Language) 2 is the language that allows the spec-
ification of executable business processes. It is xml-based and offers several activities for
the manipulation of data sent and received by the interacting partners. It uses WSDL files
to interact with each web service, and publishes its ownWSDL file to describe its incoming
and outgoing messages.
BPEL supports process flow constructs for conditional branching, parallel processes,
nested sub-processes, process joins, etc. These constructs [5] are divided into three cate-
gories: Actions, Control and Fault.
Among the Actions activities, we have:
 Empty: Used for synchronization.
 Invoke: Used to invoke a web service.
 Receive: Used to specify the partner that sends the request message.
 Reply: Used to specify the partner that receives the response message
 Assign: Used to update the value of a variable with new data. The assign activity
contains also subelements such as Copy, From and To.
Among the Control activities, we have:
13
 If: corresponds to the beginning of a conditional branch in the BPEL process. The
If activity contains subelements such as If, ElseIf, Else.
 Pick: Used to wait for one of several possible messages to arrive or for a time-out
to occur. It has the following subelements onmessage and onalarm.
 While: Used to specify that a child activity is repeated until a certain condition
becomes true.
 Foreach: Used to iterate its child scope activity exactly N+1 times, where N is
equal to the finalCounterValue minus the startCounterValue.
 RepeatUntil: Used to define that the child activity is to be repeated as long as
the specified condition is true.
 Wait: Used to wait for a certain period, or until a certain point in time is reached.
 Sequence: Used to define a collection of activities to be performed sequentially in
lexical order.
 Scope: Used to define a nested activity with its own associated partnerLinks, mes-
sageExchanges, variables, correlationSets, faultHandlers, compensationHandler, ter-
minationHandler and eventHandlers.
 Flow: Used to specify one or more activities to be performed concurrently.
Among the Fault activities, we have:
 Exit: Used to immediately end a business process.
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 Throw: Used to generate a fault from inside the process.
 Rethrow: Used to rethrow the fault that was originally caught by the immediate
enclosing fault handler.
For more computational capabilities, BPEL supports XPath to allow writing expres-
sions and queries, particularly in the control activities, for the composition of sophisticated
processes.
WS-BPEL leverages the benefits of the use of a single web service to allow the orches-
tration of many web services. It offers the ability to compose long-running asynchronous
processes with fault detection and compensation activities. Even though such orchestration
can be done using any development language such as Java, BPEL allows the abstraction in
the composition and infrastructure. Furthermore, BPEL offers the simplicity in composing
business processes without the need of traditional coding and programming. Thus any busi-
ness experts can use BPEL for process automation without any knowledge or experience
in the corresponding programming language.
2.4 Information Security
With fast evolvement of technology, security of online assets becomes a must. Since 1971,
many attacks have emerged raising awareness to the existence of malicious attackers, who
are willing to invest time and money to breach company security. This can cause huge
financial loss, and may lead to publishing company’s intellectual property to the public.
As Gasser [20] stated once, securing a computer system has traditionally been a battle of
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wits: The penetrator tries to find the holes, while the designer tries to close them. Security
engineers are in an endless battle to keep their application safe from malicious intruders.
And even though, attackers are becoming dangerous as technological equipment keeps
emerging to facilitate their work. Many security mechanisms and techniques still stand
strong and successfully outwits them.
Information Security is the protection of any computer-related asset from attacks. These
attacks can take the form of various threats, where attackers exploit a system’s vulnerability
and perform malicious actions. The following are the main security requirements to defend
against threats:
 Authentication: Corroborating the identity of an entity or source of information
 Access Control: Restricting access to resources for privileged entities
 Data Confidentiality: Keeping data secret from everyone except those who are au-
thorized to access it.
 Data Integrity: Ensuring that data has not been tempered by unauthorized parties.
 Non-Repudiation: Preventing denial of previous commitments or actions.
In this thesis, we are mainly concerned with security applied on distribute computing
systems, i.e., web services, and the different standards and mechanisms used to apply secu-
rity into web services. In the sequel, we will discuss two main standards and present their
advantages and limitations.
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2.5 Web Services Security
With all of the advantages of web services, one of the main hurdles remain security; Par-
ticularly because web services use the SOAP protocol for message exchange, which poses
a lot of security concerns when sending confidential data. Several Standards appeared to
solve the issue of web services security, among these standards we distinguish the WS-
Security and XACML policies. In the sequel, we will discuss the aforementioned security
standards.
In the real world, we use our driver license to prove our identity, membership cards to
prove our right to do certain actions. WS-Security tries to apply the same concept into the
context of web services. It is the platform that ensures the exchange of security tokens to
authenticate and authorize users in the process of data exchange. It uses the SOAP header
to transmit security-related data. For instance, in case the message was signed to ensure
integrity, the SOAP header will carry the method used for signing the message and the
resultant signature value. Thus, WS-Security is not a security method by itself. Instead
it integrates in the SOAP header information about the applied security standards. WS-
Security supports various standards for authentication, signatures and encryption such as
Kerberos and X.509.
To better illustrate the benefits of using WS-Security, consider the following scenario:
Listing 2.1: Excerpt of a SOAP Request Message
<wsse:UsernameToken>
<wsse:Username>scott</wsse:Username>
<wsse:Password Type="wsse:PasswordText">password</wsse:Password>
</wsse:UsernameToken>
Listing 2.1, shows a SOAP message with Scott’s username and password being sent
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as plain text. It is rather clear that this message is easy to break. Using WS-Security, we
can apply authentication and integrate in the SOAP header security tokens to ensure the
integrity of the encrypted soap body.
Listing 2.2: Excerpt of a WSS-SOAP Request Message
<wsse:UsernameToken>
<wsse:Username>scott</wsse:Username>
<wsse:Password Type="wsse:PasswordDigest">
KE6QugOpkPyT3Eo0SEgT30W4Keg=</wsse:Password>
<wsse:Nonce>5uW4ABku/m6/S5rnE+L7vg==</wsse:Nonce>
<wsu:Created xmlns:wsu="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/07/utility">
2002-08-19T00:44:02Z</wsu:Created></wsse:UsernameToken>
Listing 2.2 shows Scott’s password digest obtained after applying SHA-1, concatenated
with a nonce and a timestamp to ensure message integrity and avoid session replay.
XACML is an oasis standard to incorporate authentication and access control in web
services. XACML consists of a policy language and an infrastructure that help define
access rights in a web service. The policy language defines who is allowed to access which
resource and perform which action on this resource. One XACML policy may contain
several policy sets, each defining a new rule for access rights. These rules can have either
a permit or a deny effect.
Every rule in a policy has a target, that determines the subject, resource and action to
which the rule is applicable. Furthermore, rules can also contain conditions to indicate the
constraints under which this rule is applicable.
Listing 2.3 2.4 shows an example of a simple XACML policy. This policy indicates
that the subject with an admin role is allowed to access the sampleDomain and perform a
write or echo action on a condition that the admin is only granted access from 9am till 5pm
(office hours).
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Figure 3: XACML Infrastructure
In addition to the policy language, Oasis standard defined an XACML infrastructure
that consists of four components that can be distributed over the network as web services
themselves. These four components work together to provide full authentication and access
control to web services:
 Policy Administration Point (PAP): Stores XACML access control policies
 Policy Information Point (PIP): Hosts attributes about users and services
 Policy Decision Point (PDP): Decides about granting and denying access to a re-
source
 Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): Enforces a PDP’s access decision and grants or
deny physical access.
To better illustrate the dynamics of the XACML infrastructure, consider Figure 3. In
this figure, a user wants to access one of the services offered by a Flight Reservation Sys-
tem. As we have previously mentioned, this system is composed of four separate web
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services. When the user wants to access one of them, the access request is directed to this
web service’s policy enforcement point. The PEP accesses the policy information point
that stores information about the user in order to authenticate him. Subsequently, the PIP
returns a SAML token with the corresponding authentication response. Next, the PEP
accesses the policy decision point in order to retrieve the user’s access rights. The PDP
invokes the policy administration point that stores the XACML policies to return the pol-
icy of the given resource and the PIP to retrieve the SAML token. With the SAML token
and the XACML policy, the PDP returns to the PEP whether this user is granted or denied
access to the requested web service. Finally, the PEP either directs the access request to
the web service or returns to the application with a response that the user does not have the
right to access the requested resource.
2.6 Aspect-Oriented Programming
Aspect Oriented programming is a paradigm that aims to provide modularity by allowing
separation of cross-cutting concerns. There are many common features that are scattered
around the code, such as logging or metrics collection. In the case of logging, logging code
should be placed in different procedures, methods and classes where there is data to be
logged. However, this logging code is not really part of the functionality that the class or
object model is primarily concerned with. In AOP, features like logging are called cross-
cutting concerns, because they "cut across" multiple classes. AOP allows the definition
of aspects for each cross-cutting concern. These aspects allows one to pick "join points"
within the program, where specific code, also known as "advice", should run at each of
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these join points.
The foundation of AOP is the principle of "Separation of Concerns", where issues that
affect and crosscut the application are addressed separately and encapsulated within as-
pects. Then, these aspects are composed and merged with the core functionality modules
into one single application. This process of merging and composition is called weaving,
and the tools that perform such process are called weavers. Example of AOP implementa-
tions is the AspectJ that offers aspect oriented extension for Java programs. In the sequel,
we will present a formal definition of the four primary concepts used in AOP:
 Cross-cutting concerns: Is a common secondary requirement shared by several classes
in the object model and does not contribute in the logic of the primary functionality
of each of these classes, e.g. security, logging, metrics collection, etc.
 Advice: Is the additional code that is should be applied to the existing code for the
sake of the fulfillment of a cross-cutting concern.
 Pointcut: Is represented by a join point match in the code where the injected advice
needs to be executed
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 Aspect: Is the combination of pointcuts and advices for the implementation of a
cross-cutting concern. e.g. logging aspects, security aspects, etcEˇ
Listing 2.3: A Simple XACML policy - Part I
1. <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2. <Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3
.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy
:schema:os access_control-xacml-2.0-policy-schema-os.xsd"
PolicyId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:jboss-test:XV:policy" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:
oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides">
3. <Description>Sample policy</Description>
4. <Target />
5. <Rule RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:jboss-test:XVI:rule" Effect="Permit">
6. <Description/>
7. <Target>
8. <Subjects>
9. <Subject>
10. <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
11. <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">admin</
AttributeValue>
12. <SubjectAttributeDesignator
13. AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"
14. DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" />
15. </SubjectMatch>
16. <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
17. <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">role</
AttributeValue>
18. <SubjectAttributeDesignator
19. AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:subject:role" DataType="http
://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" />
20. </SubjectMatch>
21. </Subject>
22. </Subjects>
23. <Resources>
24. <Resource>
25. <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:anyURI-equal">
26. <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI">
sampleDomain</AttributeValue>
27. <ResourceAttributeDesignator
28. AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"
29. DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI" />
30. </ResourceMatch>
31. </Resource>
32. <Resource>
33. <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
34. <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
SecureEndpoint</AttributeValue>
35. <ResourceAttributeDesignator
36. AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"
37. DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" />
38. </ResourceMatch>
39. </Resource>
40. </Resources>
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Listing 2.4: A Simple XACML policy - Part II
41. <Actions>
42. <Action>
43. <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
44. <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">write</
AttributeValue>
45. <ActionAttributeDesignator
46. AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"
47. DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" />
48. </ActionMatch>
49. </Action>
50. <Action>
51. <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
52. <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">echo</
AttributeValue>
53. <ActionAttributeDesignator
54. AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"
55. DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" />
56. </ActionMatch>
57. </Action>
58. </Actions>
59. </Target>
60.
61. <Condition FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and">
62. <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-greater-than-or-
equal">
63. <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-one-and-only">
64. <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:environment:current-time" />
65. </Apply>
66. <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time">09:00:00</
AttributeValue>
67. </Apply>
68. <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-less-than-or-equal
">
69. <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-one-and-only">
70. <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:environment:current-time" />
71. </Apply>
72. <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time">17:00:00</
AttributeValue>
73. </Apply>
74. </Condition>
75. </Rule>
76. </Policy>
2.7 Related Work
In this section, we will provide an overview on related work in the area of web services
security, and the use of AOP to allow modularity for modeling cross cutting concerns.
Web services security is one of the topics that attracted the attention of the research
community. From the definition of standards to the publication of research papers, the
goal is to provide policies and mechanisms for enforcing web services security. In this
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context, several policy standard languages such as Security Assertion Markup language
(SAML) [19], WS-Security [8] and WS-XACML [23] were proposed.
SAML [19] is a specification language that is proposed by OASIS. Based on XML, it
defines how to specify security credentials, which are represented as assertions. SAML
can be used to manage secure sessions between organizations and can leverage several
mechanisms such as basic password authentication, SSL and X. 509 certificates, etc. A
security token is delivered to the requester after successful authentication. This security
token allows granting certain permissions to the requester.
WS-Security [8] is a standard that is proposed by IBM, Microsoft, and Verisign. WS-
Security is a means for using XML to encrypt and digitally sign SOAP messages. Another
feature of WS-Security is that it allows exchanging security tokens for authentication and
authorization of SOAP messages.
The web Service eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (WS-XACML) [23]
is proposed by OASIS as XML-based language to specify and exchange access control
policies. WS-XACML is designed to define authorization policies for principals that are
specified using XML.
Bhatti et al. [28] proposed X-RBAC: an XML-based RBAC policy specification frame-
work for enforcing access control in dynamic XML-based web services. The specification
uses representations of users, roles and permissions. The two main components of the
proposed framework are: the XML and the RBAC processors. The XML processor is im-
plemented in Java using Java API for XML Processing (JAXP). Some modules have the
duty to get the DOM instance of parsed XML documents and forward them to the RBAC
Processor. The RBAC module is responsible for administration and enforcement of the
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policy according to the supplied policy information.
Damiani et al. [10] proposed a design of a web service architecture for enforcing ac-
cess control policies. They also provide an example of implementation based on the WS-
Policy [2], [3] as access control language. The main components of the proposed archi-
tecture are: Policy Administration Point (PAP), Policy Evaluation Point (PEP) and Policy
Decision Point (PDP). The PAP module is a policy repository that provides an administra-
tive interface for inserting, updating, and deleting policies. The PEP module realizes the
enforcement of the policies returned by the PAP module. The access request is granted if
at least one policy is satisfied; the access is denied otherwise. A PDP module is the inter-
face between the service and the enforcer module. It is responsible for taking final access
control decisions based on the input from the PEP module.
Bertino et al. [14] proposed a RBAC-WS-BPEL framework for defining authorization
policies and constraints for WS-BPEL business processes. WS-BPEL is a language for
composing web services. To specify authorization policies, the authors used XACML.
They introduce the Business Process Constraint Language (BPCL), which can be used to
specify authorization constraints. The users are associated with roles as done in Role Based
Access Control (RBAC) models.
All the aforementioned approaches target the security policies implementation, deploy-
ment and/or verification at the web services side. Moreover, they do not address any of
the aforementioned problems at the BPEL level, e.g. dynamic adaptation, services inter-
ruption and performance. On the other hand, our approach relies on enforcing the security
policies into the BPEL process of the composed web services. These policies are specified
as separate components, i.e., AspectBPEL aspects, then integrated systematically using
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the AspectBPEL weaver into the BPEL process. The security features can be activated at
runtime on selected locations in the BPEL process. This allows to easily update the secu-
rity measures dynamically when needed, without affecting the business logic of the BPEL
process.
In the same line of research, Charfi et al. [11] introduced the AO4BPEL, an aspect
oriented extension for BPEL that offers modularity and adaptability to workflow processes.
The join points are represented by activities in the BPEL process. Pointcuts are represented
in the XPATH language and advices are the BPEL activities to be added. This work has
been extended in the Cooperative Aspect Oriented Programming for Executable Business
Processes (Co-AOP) tool, which aims at making the aspects reusable [15]. An aspect code
is developed for a specific BPEL process, which makes it difficult to reuse. The Co-AOP
alleviates that challenge by introducing what is called the Explicit Join Points (EJP). These
EJP allow the base code to be aware of the aspect interfaces, and hence improve aspect
reusability by decoupling base code and aspects. These aspects are initiated in the base code
and described in their advices code, which forces the communication to be parameterized
between both the base and aspects code.
The AO4BPEL offers the BPEL process the ability to adapt to future changes in the
BPEL process. However, AO4BPEL has few limitations. First, it requires the use of a
special orchestration engine to manage the BPEL process, which makes it incompatible
with the major adopted BPEL development environments such as Eclipse, NetBeans, etc.
Second, their approach imposes overhead since it performs a check on each activity in the
process to determine whether or not their aspect code is associated with it. On the other
hand, our approach proposes a framework that is fully operational on any BPEL process
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regardless of the adopted development environment. Moreover, our approach reduces enor-
mously the overhead since it is based on intercepting only selective join points, i.e. only
those that are associated with the aspect code.
Regarding the usability of AOP for security, the following is a brief overview of the
available contributions. In the contexts of programming languages, CSAW was introduced
as an AOP language proposed by Cigital labs [1], which is a superset of the C program-
ming language to integrate security in C programs. De Win, in his Ph.D. thesis [12], also
discussed an AOP approach that adopts the concept of AOSD for defining security aspects
to be weaved within applications. In [9], Ron Bodkin presented a survey on the various
security requirements within enterprise applications, with a focus on security cross cutting
concerns particulary in authentication and authorization. Furthermore, we find the the Java
Security Aspect Library (JSAL), in which Huang et al. [21] introduced a reusable library
of security functions implemented in AspectJ. Huang et al.’s work is thus added to the list
of contributions in the area of adopting AOP to implement security features.
In [29], Shlowikowski and Ziekinski discussed some security solutions implemented in
AspectJ that combines between J2EE, JBoss application server, Java Authentication and
Authorization service API (JAAS) and Resource Access Decision Facility (RAD). These
approaches are useful to explore the feasibility of using AOP in software security. Hence,
we can benefit from their achievements in building our security model.
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Chapter 3
AspectBPEL Framework for the
Dynamic Enforcement of Web Services
Security
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is dedicated to the description of a new framework for the dynamic enforce-
ment of web services security, which is based on a synergy between Aspect-Oriented Pro-
gramming (AOP) and a composition of web services. This synergy is achieved through the
elaboration of a dedicated language called AspectBPEL. The elaborated AspectBPEL lan-
guage allows to specify security policies as separate components, namely, aspects. These
aspects are weaved systematically in the BPEL (Business Process Execution Language)
process for the sake of activating the security policies at runtime on specific join points.
Our framework’s main contribution are :
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1. Elaborate an approach to separate the business and security concerns of composite
web services, and hence developing them separately.
2. Elaborate a language and a framework that is fully operational and compatible with
any BPEL process regardless of the adopted development environments (e.g., Eclipse,
NetBeans, Oracle).
3. Develop a compiler to ensure the correctness of the syntax and a weaver for the
modular integration of cross-cutting concerning.
4. Build a case study to prove the efficiency and effectiveness of our framework.
We verified the usability and feasibility of our approach using an Online Purchase Sys-
tem (OPS) case study. The OPS is composed of several distributed Web services and im-
plements a Role Based Access Control model that indicates the different roles in the system
as well as each role access rights. Security policies, corresponding to the aforementioned
RBAC model, has been developed and translated into AspectBPEL. Then, by applying
the proposed approach and using the AspectBPEL framework and compiler, the aspects
are weaved at different join points in the BPEL process of the OPS, providing dynamic
activation of the authentication and access control features. Experimental results and per-
formance analysis are presented to defend our propositions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as following: Section 3.2 is devoted to the descrip-
tion of the Online Purchase System (OPS). Section 3.3 is dedicated to the illustration of
the proposed approach and framework architecture. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 are devoted to
the presentation of the elaborated AspectBPEL language and its corresponding compiler.
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In Sections 3.6 and 3.7, we present the RBAC-OPS model and its application using As-
pectBPEL, in addition to experimental results. In Section 3.8, we discuss the performance
analysis performed on our framework. Finally, we conclude the paper in section 3.9.
3.2 Illustrative Example: Online Purchase-System Web
Services
In this section, we describe the architecture of the online purchase systemWeb services and
their corresponding BPEL process. The explanation of the illustrative example is needed
to understand the proposed approach presented in the following section.
3.2.1 Online Purchase System Overview
Figure 5 explores the interactions between the user, BPEL process and Web services of the
online purchase system. As depicted in the figure, the security features are deployed on the
Web services side (i.e, not in the BPEL process). This clearly shows that a security check
is needed at each Web service(s).
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Figure 5: OPS Architecture
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Our online purchase system is mainly composed of several distributed Web services, a
BPEL process and a graphical user interface that allows the user to make an online pur-
chase, refund purchased items, request for shipment, order new items and apply discount
on items. The available services are shown in the system entry page. First, the online
purchase service allows the user to buy items online. Second, the refund purchase service
lets the user return bought items for a given reason(in case a client is not satisfied with the
service). The request for shipment service allows the user to enter the needed information
for shipment like location,address, PO.Box, etc... The user has also the ability to order new
items and apply discounts to gold member clients.
All users who can access the system have records in the corresponding Web service(s)
database. In other words, each user has an ID and a Password stored in the database, in
addition to his/her personal information. Each time a user wishes to access one of the
online purchase system services, the authentication, access control and policy checker of
the selected Web service(s) are invoked to ensure that he/she is not only a valid user, but
he/she also has the permission to view the requested information based on the provided
policiy rules.
3.2.2 BPEL Process Architecture
Figure 6 illustrates a part of the the architecture of the BPEL process of our online purchase
system. For space restriction, the figure only explores one service invoke from the BPEL
process. This web service is referred to as AnyOPSWebService and it may or may not run
with security on the side. The process is invoked when the user requests one of the services
31
offered by the Web service. It begins by assigning the client’s input to the OnlinePurchas-
eService Request message, then it calls the appropriate operation of the requested service
and returns the needed info. Finally, the Web service response message is assigned to the
BPEL process output variable and forwarded to the client.
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Figure 6: OPS BPEL Process
3.3 Approach Description & Framework Architecture
In this section we describe our approach and the architecture of the AspectBPEL Frame-
work. Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP) [13, 16–18, 27] is one of the most prominent
paradigms for integrating non-functional requirements (e.g. security) into software. The
main objective of AOP is to have a separation between cross-cutting concerns. This is
achieved through the definition of aspects. Each aspect is a separate module in which
pointcuts are defined. A pointcut identifies one or more join points. A join point iden-
tifies one or many flow points in a program (in our case a program is a BPEL process).
At these points, some advices will be executed. An advice contains some code that can
alter the process behavior at a certain flow point. The integration of aspects within the
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application (BPEL) code is called weaving and is performed through one of the weaving
technologies/compilers (e.g., AspectJ [17]).
Security is one of the most important aspects of a software. Generally, developers did
not separate between security and business logic code. This means that any change in the
security strategy has to be done on the application code, which can have impact on the
business logic. AOP helps solve this issue by embedding security in aspects. Aspects allow
to precisely and selectively define and integrate security objects, methods and events within
application at selected join points, which make them interesting solutions for many security
issues. Many contributions [1, 9, 12, 21] [22] [30] [25], have proven the usefulness of AOP
for integrating security features into software.
In this context, we propose an aspect-oriented framework for the dynamic enforcement
of Web services security. The framework includes a language called AspectBPEL and its
corresponding compiler. Our proposition is based on the use of AOP in the BPEL process
of the composed Web services. Figure 7 illustrates the framework architecture and depicts
all the interactions and flow of controls between its components. The system procedures
begin by having security requirements expressed as security policies (e.g. in XACML).
The security policies are then specified as BPEL security aspect(s) using the proposed As-
pectBPEL Language. The formulated aspect(s) together with the selected BPEL process of
the composed web services are then passed to the AspectBPEL Weaver, which is respon-
sible of generating the secured BPEL process with all the features specified in the security
aspect(s). At the back end of the weaver, we have the AspectBPEL compiler that parses
and compiles the BPEL security aspect(s), parses the BPEL process and identifies the se-
lected join points, constructs the data structure required for the static and dynamic weaving
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process, and finally weaves the aforementioned aspect(s) into the BPEL process.
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Figure 7: Framework Architecture
The application of the proposed approach on the OPS illustrative example is depicted
in Figure 8. It illustrates the BPEL process where the invoke of the security features is
embedded in BPEL aspects. By comparing Figure 6 with Figure 8, we can see that the
security features are no longer part of the Web services, and hence any modification in the
security policies can be reflected in the BPEL aspects that are activated dynamically in the
system BPEL process. The BPEL aspects may contain direct security verification to be
integrated at some identified join points in the BPEL process, or it may contain an invoke
to external Web service(s) that handle the security policies verification. Examples of BPEL
security aspects are presented in Section 3.7.
Access control is an instance of security features that requires a run-time check to de-
termine if a user has the right to perform a specific operation. Embedding these features in
BPEL aspects allows run-time check and dynamic update in case the verification strategy
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changes. Moreover, Web services security is generally represented as a specification of
policy rules that are specified in languages such as XACML, WS-Policiy, etc. By combin-
ing the policies of the Web services into one single process level policy and placing the
security policy check at the BPEL side, we can significantly reduce the run-time at each
Web service invoke, and thus contribute in reducing the overall execution time of the BPEL
process. In fact, through pointcuts and join points, security checks can be injected in cer-
tain flow points of the BPEL process. The specification of these pointcuts can be updated
at any time without the need to modify the business logic.
3.4 AspectBPEL: Aspect-Oriented Language for BPEL
In this section, we present a brief description of the AspectBPEL language. The elabo-
rated language allows the description and specification of security BPEL aspects. It is a
language based on advice-pointcut model. We developed AspectBPEL with notations and
expressions close to those of the current AOP methodologies but adapted to BPEL. The
following are the main features provided by AspectBPEL:
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 Automatic BPEL code manipulation such as code addition, substitution, deletion,
etc.
 Specification of particular BPEL join points where security code would be injected.
 Description and specification of BPEL aspects.
 Description and specification of reusable BPEL aspects.
 Compatibility with the XPath Language.
3.4.1 Grammar
In this section, we present the syntactic constructs of AspectBPEL and their informal se-
mantics. Figure 9 illustrates the grammar of AspectBPEL.
BPEL Aspect Structure
A BPEL aspect starts with the keyword Aspect, followed by the aspect name. Next
comes the aspect code that starts and ends respectively by the keywords BeginAspect
and EndAspect.
The aspect code is based on AOP and consists of one or many BPEL_Location_-
Behavior constructs. Each is composed of a BPEL_Insertion_Point and BPEL_-
Location_Identifier, where the BPEL behavior code should be injected. A detailed
explanation of the components of the aspect code will be illustrated in Section 3.4.2.
The list of AspectBPEL pointcuts, identified in our language as BPEL_Location_-
Identifier are grouped into three categories: Actions, Controls and Faults that we
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BPEL_Aspect ::= Aspect Aspect_Name
BPEL_Aspect_Body
BPEL_Aspect_Body ::= BeginAspect
BPEL_Location_Behavior*
EndAspect
BPEL_Location_Behavior ::= BPEL_Insertion_Point
BPEL_Location_Identifier
BPEL_Behavior_Code
BPEL_Insertion_Point ::= Before
j After
j Replace
BPEL_Location_Identifier ::= Assign <Signature>
j Invoke <Signature>
j Receive <Signature>
j Reply <Signature>
j Empty <Signature>
j If <Signature>
j Pick <Signature>
j While <Signature>
j Foreach <Signature>
j RepeatUntil <Signature>
j Wait <Signature>
j Sequence <Signature>
j Scope <Signature>
j Flow <Signature>
j Exit <Signature>
j Throw <Signature>
j Rethrow <Signature>
BPEL_Condition ::= &&
j Variable <Signature>
BPEL_Behavior_Code ::= BeginBehavior
BPEL Code Statements
EndBehavior
Figure 9: Grammar of AspectBPEL
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already listed in section 2.3. These pointcuts allow to match all the activities of a BPEL
process, where a BPEL code can be inserted before, after or even replace the matched one.
The name of each activity is enclosed in < ::: > symbols that follows the pointcut. The
activity’s name represents the activity’s signature.While some IDEs allow duplicate activity
names, it is rather a common practice to adopt unique names for BPEL activities to alleviate
ambiguities and keep the process clear.
3.4.2 Informal Semantics
In this Section, we present the informal semantics of the important syntactic constructs in
AspectBPEL language.
BPEL_Location_Behavior Is based on the advice-pointcut model of AOP. An aspect
may include one or many BPEL_Location_Behavior. Each BPEL_Location_-
Behavior is composed of the BPEL_Insertion_Point, BPEL_Location_Iden-
tifierand BPEL_Behavior_Code.
BPEL_Insertion_Point Specifies the point of code insertion after identifying the loca-
tion. The BPEL_Insertion_Point can have the following three values: Before,
After or Replace. The Replacemeans remove the code at the identified location and
replace it with the new code, while the Before or After means keep the old code at the
identified location and insert the new code before or after it respectively.
BPEL_Location_Identifier Identifies the joint point or sets of joint points in the pro-
gram where the changes specified in the BPEL_Behavior_Code should be applied. The
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list of identifiers used in the BPEL_Location_Identifier corresponds to BPEL ac-
tivities together with their signatures (i.e. name, id and parameters).
BPEL_Condition Identifies the condition that should be validated in order to activate the
behavior code. By specifying the name of the variable to be tested and in the signature an
operator and a threshold value, we can equip the AspectBPEL with the ability to activate
and deactivate a behavior code based on certain conditions.
BPEL_Behavior_Code Contains code written in XPath language, that will be weaved
into the BPEL Process. The code will be inserted before/after or replace the location iden-
tifier previously stated.
3.5 AspectBPEL Compiler and Framework Implementa-
tion
We used ANTLR V3 Beta 6 and its associated ANTLRWorks V1.4. development envi-
ronment [26] for the AspectBPEL language description and compiler implementation. The
generated Java code allows to parse the BPEL aspect, verify the correctness of its syntax
and weaved into the BPEL process. Moreover, we integrated this compiler into a devel-
opment graphical user interface. The resulting system provides the user with graphical
facilities to develop, compile, debug and run BPEL aspects. Figure 11 shows a screenshot
of this system where we can see an AspectBPEL compiling, together with the BPEL pro-
cess to be hardened. The compilation process is divided into two phases that are performed
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consequently and automatically. The success of one phase leads to execute the next one. In
the sequel, we present and explain these phases.
3.5.1 AspectBPEL Compilation
The first phase consists of compiling the AspectBPEL code in order to verify if it respects
the aforementioned aspect BPEL structure, this includes automatically parsing and compil-
ing the aspect contents to check the correctness of its syntax, and building the data structure
required for the running process. If an error was found, the compilation stops, and an error
messages appears on the console indicating the reason that caused the compilation failure.
3.5.2 AspectBPEL Running and Weaving
Once the corresponding aspect is compiled successfully, the execution command is con-
structed based on the information provided in the data structure, which is built during the
previous compilation phases. Afterwards, the aspect is weaved with the specified process
and the resulted hardened BPEL process is produced.
3.6 RBAC-OPS: AnAuthorizationModel for a Online Purchase-
System Web Services
In this section, we focus on describing the RBAC-OPS model of our OPS. First, we define
the RBAC-OPS model, then we present an excerpt of an XACML-based access control
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policy specification for the system. We recall that XACML is an XML based language for
policy specification.
3.6.1 RBAC-OPS Model Definitions
This model inherits all the components of traditional RBAC models: users, roles, per-
missions, role hierarchies, user-role assignment, and role-permission assignment relations.
Users are assigned to roles and roles are assigned to permissions. An RBAC permission
represents the ability to access a certain system service. A user is permitted to execute a
service activity if he/she is assigned to a role that has the permission to perform that service.
RBAC roles are structured in a hierarchy. More details about describing RBAC model for
Web services is presented in [14].
A: is the identifier of an activity (e.g., Apply Discount ).
R: is the set of roles (e.g., Manager, Supervisor, Employee and Staff).
U: is the set of potential users.
P: is the set of permissions, (e.g., execution of an activity).
Definition 1: RBAC-OPS Permission
Let OPS be our System. A RBAC-OPS permission is a tuple (Ai, Action), where Ai is
the identifier of an activity in OPS and Action identifies the type of the action that can
be performed on activity Ai. For example, the tuple (Apply Discount, execute) allows the
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authorized user to execute the "Apply Discount" service provided by the Online Purchase
System.
Definition 2: RBAC-OPS Role
AnRBAC-OPS role r is a set of attribute conditions r= {aci j aci=AttrNamei op AttrV aluei},
where AttrNamei identifies a user attribute name, op is a comparison or a set of opera-
tors, and AttrV aluei is a value, a set, or a range of attribute values. Note that the roles r
and r0 might be recognized by the same set of attribute names. However, it is a must that
at least one of the values that the attributes of r and r0 assume must be different. A user
can be assigned to only one role while two users identified by the same attributes with the
same values are assigned to the same role since we assume that a set of attribute conditions
uniquely identifies a role.
Definition 3: RBAC-OPS Role Hierarchy
Let R be a partially ordered set of roles. A role hierarchy defined over R is the graph of
the partial-order relation between the roles in R. If r, r0 2 R and r < r0, then we say r0
dominates r. For instance, our online purchase system consists of four different roles. The
highest role is theManager which has access to all the available services. The supervisor
and employee come next in the hierarchy. They have less access rights than the leader but
more access rights than the client members. Figure 10 illustrates the role hierarchy of the
online purchase management system.
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 Manager 
Supervisor Employee 
Client 
Figure 10: RBAC-OPS Role Hierarchy
Table 1: RBAC-OPS Role Hierarchy
R
Manager {Employment= Manager, ID= a string of at most 9
characters, Password= a string of at most 9 characters}
Employee {Employment= Employee, ID= integer of 9 digits,
Password= a string of at most 9 characters}
Supervisor {Employment= Supervisor, ID= integer of 9 digits,
Password= a string of at most 9 characters}
Client {Employment= None, ID= integer of 9 digits,
Password= a string of at most 9 characters}
Definition 4: RBAC-OPS User-Role Assignment Relation
LetU be the set of all potential users andR be a partial ordered set of roles. The RBAC-OPS
user assignment relation is the set of attributes UA= {(u,r) 2U x R j 8 aci =AttrNamei op
AttrV aluei 2 r; 9 attrj 2 CredSet(u)1 j attrj= AttrNamei
V
aci is evaluated to “true”
according to the value of attrj}. As for the online purchase system, the set of roles are
R={Manager, Employee, Supervisor and Client}. Assigning users to roles results in a set
of attributes that defines the RBAC-Online purchase user assignment relation. For exam-
ple, in our Online Purchase System, the set of attribute conditions for the Manager role is
r= {Type= “Manager”, ID= a string of 9 characters, Password= a string of at most 9 char-
acters}; thus a credential set of the user u={Type= “Manager”, ID=“Nadia”, Password=
“Moati”} will be evaluated as “true” and u is assigned toManager.
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Definition 5: RBAC-OPS User-Permission Assignment
Let P be the set of permissions of the activity A1 supported by the system, and RP be
the set of permission/role assignments. Thus, the RBAC-OPS user-permission assignment
relation is the set of attributes UP= {(u,p) 2 U x P j 9 (u,r) 2 UA j (r,p) 2 RP}. For
instance, a permission to order new items is assigned to Manager by the RP relation.
Thus, a user u can order new items only if he is assigned first toManager.
3.7 Case Study: Dynamic Enforcement of the RBAC-OPS
Model in the OPS
In this section, we present the implementation of the RBAC model for the Online Purchase
System that illustrates all the procedures and mechanisms described in our proposed ap-
proach for the dynamic enforcement of authentication and access control features in OPS.
3.7.1 RBAC-OPS XACML Specification
Listing 3.1 outlines a summary of the XACML-based access control policy for the OPS.
Due to space limitation, we included in the listing the role and permissions of the em-
ployee. The others are set in similar way. First, the roles are defined. A general role (root
of the hierarchy) is denoted by Manager. It has 2 sub-roles, Employee and Supervisor,
and as manager is giving permission to perform any action to any resource. The Em-
ployee and Supervisor roles have client as common sub-role and are assigned respectively
to PPS:employee:role and PPS:supervisor:role policies. The client role has PPS:client:role
44
as policy. Each of the permission policies defines the set of permissions related to each
role. For instance, the PPS:supervisor:role includes applying a discount.
3.7.2 BPEL Aspects Realizing the RBAC-OPS Model
In what follows, we describe BPEL aspects for authentication and access control realizing
the aforementioned XACML policy of the RBAC-OPS model.
User Authentication BPEL Aspect
For user Authentication, Listing 3.2 illustrates excerpt of an aspect to authenticate the user
and assign him role and permission(s). Role and permission descriptions are presented
in the aforementioned RBAC-OPS model (see description in section 3.6). We define the
location identifier of the Authentication behavioral code to be after the <bpel:receive...>
construct that receives the request from the user and on condition that the user is accessing
the system before 5 pm (closing hours). The Authentication aspect code consists first of
assigning the client login info to the Web service request message. Then, the web service is
invoked. This latter calls the UserAuthentication operation that loops through the database
and returns one of four possible indexes: 1 if the client’s username is invalid, 2 if the client
has entered correct username and password, 3 if he entered valid username but incorrect
password or 4 if he has no more trials and is not allowed to login anymore. Our system
allows the user three trials to enter the correct credentials. After the invoke, an If condition
is integrated to check the result returned by the web service. If the user is not authenti-
cated, the web service is invoked again to get the appropriate error string for the returned
index. The returned error string is then assigned to the BPEL process output variable and
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forwarded to the client. On the other hand, if the user is authenticated, the BPEL process
continues its execution.
BPEL Aspect for Access Control of OPS Services
Listing 3.3 illustrates an excerpt of the generated aspect that realize the XACML policy
of Listing 3.1 to authorize the user access to OPS services. Due to space limitation, we
included in the listing the AspectBPEL code that enforce access control on the RefundItems
service. The others are set in similar way. As described in the aforementioned RBAC-OPS
model (please see description in section 3.6), each user is assigned a role together with
its corresponding permission(s). This RBAC model was reflected in the XACML policy
and generated into a BPEL aspect code accordingly. The generated aspect code integrates
the access control verification before the execution of each invoke activity whose port type
and operation were specified in the XACML policy. It begins by an If activity that tests if
the value returned by the Authentication partner link response message corresponds to an
authorized role. If the check returns a true, then the BPEL process continues by invoking
the appropriate web Service. Otherwise it returns an error message and the BPEL process
exists.
3.7.3 Experimental Results
Weaving the security aspects in Listing 3.2 and Listing 3.3 with the BPEL process of the
online purchase system presented in Figure 6 produces the secure BPEL process illustrated
in Figure 19. The resulted BPEL process provides dynamic authentication and access con-
trol features for the online purchase system. The BPEL process begins by receiving the
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client’s login info and the index of the service he requested. After receiving the input, the
authentication Web service gets invoked to ensure that the user has valid username and
password. If he is not authenticated, the process enters the conditional branch and returns
an error string to inform the client of the authentication failure. On the other hand, if the
user is authenticated, the process will continue to assign the client’s input to the access con-
trol request message. Then, the access control Web service gets invoked to get the client’s
permission level and check whether the client has the right to see the requested service. If
the access is denied, the process assigns the access control response message to the BPEL
output variable and forwards it to the client. Otherwise, the process will proceed to invoke
the flight systemWeb service AnyOPSWebservice and return the client’s requested service.
Verifying the successful integration of the RBAC-OPS security features in the original
BPEL code of the online purchase system has been performed through extensive testing.
Additional efforts have been spent on verifying that the original functionalities of the sys-
tem have not been altered. Also several modifications have been applied to the security
policy and reflected dynamically in the corresponding BPEL aspects. Consequently, the
modification has been applied dynamically onto the BPEL process, which explores the
feasibility and appropriateness of our propositions.
3.8 Performance Analysis
To better demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, a performance analysis has been
performed to measure the variation in the execution time of the BPEL process for three dif-
ferent scenarios: A non-secured BPEL process (NS-BPEL), a BPEL process with security
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implemented at theWeb Service side (WS-Security) and a BPEL process with AspectBPEL
security (AspectBPEL-Security). In the AspectBPEL-Security case, an analysis has been
also performed to measure the compilation and weaving time.
The execution time (including the three scenarios) has been measured upon the number
of invokes that the BPEL process includes, reflecting the number of participating Web
services. The higher the number of invokes are, the bigger and more complex the BPEL
process becomes. This helps to demonstrate the scalability of our approach. The execution
time has been measured using the Visual Studio Profiling Tool [7]. This tool allows us to
read the running time of the process call. Due to the variations in the execution time of a
single process call for the same number of invokes, the average of multiple execution has
been calculated to reduce the margin of deviation.
Figure 13-a illustrates the following results:
 NS-BPEL process runs at an average of 8493 msec when enclosing 10 web services
invokes. It augments linearly to an average of 70000 msec for 100 Web services
invokes.
 WS-Security process runs at an average of 9500 msec when enclosing 10 web ser-
vices invokes. It reaches an average of 90000 msec for 100 Web services invokes.
 AspectBPEL-Security process runs at an average of 9300 msec when enclosing 10
web services invokes. It reaches an average of 72000 msec for 100 Web services in-
vokes. This gives a redeem of more than 10000 msec from the WS-Security process.
The achieved results are promising and so close from the NS-BPEL process ones.
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Next, we measured the compilation and weaving time of the AspectBPEL-Security
framework using the Eclipse Test and Performance Tools Platform [4]. The compilation
and weaving runtime represent the time needed to weave the AspectBPEL security aspects
into a BPEL process. By looking at Figure 13-B and Figure 13-C, we notice that the
compilation and weaving runtime are linear with respect to the size of the AspecBPEL
aspect. The size of an aspect is measured by the number of pointcuts/advices.
The aim of this analysis, is not only to show how fast the compilation and weaving func-
tions can be, but also to explore that with the overall overhead, the AspectBPEL-Security
enabled process is still faster than a WS-BPEL process. For instance, suppose that the
BPEL process with 25 invokes needs an AspectBPEL aspect with 25 different pointcuts,
that is, 25 different security behaviors for each one of these invokes. The total runtime of
this process will be equal to the compilation time + weaving time + runtime of the process
= 1295.53 + 2165.211 + 15687.758 = 19147 < 19737 (runtime of WS-Security).
Finally, Table 2 shows how the size of the .bpel and .wsdl files of the Online Purchase
system process varies in each of the aforementioned scenarios. The size is measured by
lines of code. Naturally, the process with AspectBPEL-Security is bigger due to the size of
the AspectBPEL code weaved-in in order to implement security on the process side.
Table 2: Size of the OPSProcess BPEL and WSDL Files
NS-BPEL WS-Security AspectBPEL-Security
OPSProcess.bpel 178 Lines 264 Lines 272 Lines
OPSProcess.wsdl 67 Lines 80 Lines 76 Lines
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3.9 Conclusion
We presented in this chapter a new approach for the dynamic enforcement of Web services
security. Our proposition is based on a synergy between AOP and composition of Web
services. It allows the separation between business and security concerns of composite
Web services, and hence developing them separately. It also allows the modification of the
Web services composition at run time and provides modularity for modeling cross-cutting
concerns between Web services. The experiments resulting from developing the RBAC-
OPS model and their BPEL aspects, and then deploying them dynamically in the BPEL
process of the online purchase system together with the performance analysis demonstrate
the feasibility and appropriateness of our propositions. They also illustrate the successful
dynamic integration and modification of authentication and access control features in the
online purchase system.
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Figure 11: AspectBpel Weaver Snapshot
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Listing 3.1: Excerpt of XACML-based Access Control Policy for OPS
1. <PolicySet>
2. <!--Role policy set for the manager-->
3. ...
4. <!--Permissions policy set for the manager-->
5. ...
6. <!--Permission to order new items-->
7. ...
8. <!--Include permissions of Employee and Supervisor roles-->
9. <!--Role policy set for the supervisor-->
10. ...
11. <!--Permissions policy set for the supervisor-->
12. ...
13. <!--Permission to apply discount-->
14. ...
15. <!--Include permissions of client role-->
16. ...
17. <!--Role policy set for the employee-->
18. <Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" PolicyId="RPS:employee:
role" PolicyCombiningAlgId="policy-combine:permit-overrides">
19. <Target>
20. <Subjects><Subject>
21. <SubjectMatch MatchId="function:anyURI-equal">
22. <AttributeValue DataType="xml:anyURI">employee</AttributeValue>
23. <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="role" DataType="xml:anyURI"/>
24. </SubjectMatch>
25. </Subject></Subjects>
26. </Target>
27. <!--Include permissions of employee role-->
28. <PolicyIdReference>PPS:employee:role</PolicyIdReference>
29. </Policy>
30. <!--Permissions policy set for the employee-->
31. <Policy PolicyId="PPS:employee:role" RuleCombiningAlgId="rule-combine:permit-
overrides">
32. <!--Permission to refund items-->
33. <Rule RuleId="Permission:to:refund:items" Effect="Permit">
34. <Target>
35. <Resources><Resource>
36. <ResourceMatch MatchId="function:string-equal">
37. <AttributeValue DataType="xml:string">ProductsWS</AttributeValue>
38. <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="resource:resource-id" DataType="
xml:string"/>
39. </ResourceMatch>
40. </Resource></Resources>
41. <Actions><Action>
42. <ActionMatch MatchId="function:string-equal">
43. <AttributeValue DataType="xml:string">RefundItems</AttributeValue>
44. <ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="action:action-id" DataType="xml:
string"/>
45. </ActionMatch>
46. </Action></Actions>
47. </Target></Rule>
48. <!--Include permissions of client role-->
49. <PolicyIdReference>PPS:client:role</PolicyIdReference>
50. </Policy>
51. <!--Role policy set for the client-->
52. ...
53. <!--Permissions policy set for the client-->
54. ...
55. <!--Permission to make purchase-->
56. ...
57. <!--Permission to request for shipment-->
58. ...
59. </PolicySet>
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Listing 3.2: Aspect for Authentication
1. Aspect Authentication
2. BeginAspect
3.
4. After
5. Receive <receiveInput> && Current_Time < 5:00 pm
6.
7. BeginBehavior
8. <!-Initialize Authentication Request Message-->
9. <bpel:assign validate="no" name="Assign Input to Authentication message">
10. ...
11.
12. <!-Invoking the Authentication WS-->
13. <bpel:invoke name="Invoke Authentication" partnerLink="Authentication" operation="
userAuthentication" portType="ns:Authentication" inputVariable="AuthenticationRequest
" outputVariable="AuthenticationResponse">
14. </bpel:invoke>
15.
16. <!-- if User is InValid, Reply with error message and Exit Process-->
17. <bpel:if name="If Invalid User"> <bpel:condition><![CDATA[(
$AuthenticationResponse.parameters/ns:userAuthenticationReturn!=2)]]>
18. </bpel:condition>
19. <bpel:sequence>
20.
21. <!-Initialize the ErrorString message-->
22. ...
23. <!-Copy the AuthenticationResponse to the ErrorStr -->
24. ...
25. <!-Invoke GetErrorStr WS-->
26. ...
27. <!-Initialize Bpel Output Message-->
28. ...
29. <!-Copy Authentication ErrorStr to Output variable-->
30. ...
31. <!-Return "User Not Authorized" to the Client"-->
32. <bpel:reply name=" Return ErrorString" partnerLink="client" operation="process"
portType="tns:AnyWSProcess" variable="output">
33. </bpel:reply>
34. </bpel:sequence>
35. </bpel:if>
36. EndBehavior
37. EndAspect
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Listing 3.3: Excerpt of Generated BPEL Aspect for Access Control
1. Aspect AccessControl
2. BeginAspect
3.
4. Before
5. Invoke <OrderItem>
6. BeginBehavior
7. <!-Accessed by the manager-->
8. ...
9. EndBehavior
10.
11. Before
12. Invoke <ApplyDiscount>
13. BeginBehavior
14. <!-Accessed by the manager and supervisor-->
15. ...
16. EndBehavior
17.
18. Before
19. Invoke <RefundItems>
20. BeginBehavior
21. <!-Accessed by the manager and employee-->
22. <bpel:if name="If" odebpelc:lineno="61" xmlns:http="urn:http:namesapce">
23. <bpel:condition odebpelc:lineno="61">$AuthenticationPartnerLinkResponse.parameters
/ns:checkAuthentication != "employee" or $AuthenticationPartnerLinkResponse.parameters
/ns:checkAuthentication != "manager" </bpel:condition>
24. <bpel:sequence odebpelc:lineno="61"><bpel:assign name="AssignError" odebpelc:
lineno="61" validate="no">
25. <bpel:copy odebpelc:lineno="61">
26. <bpel:from odebpelc:lineno="61"><bpel:literal><tns:processResponse xmlns:tns="
http://test" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3org/2001/XMLSchemainstance"><tns:result>tns:
result</tns:result></tns:processResponse></bpel:literal></bpel:from>
27. <bpel:to odebpelc:lineno="61" part="payload" variable="output"/>
28. </bpel:copy>
29. <bpel:copy odebpelc:lineno="61">
30. <bpel:from odebpelc:lineno="61">"AccessDenied"</bpel:from>
31. <bpel:to odebpelc:lineno="61" part="payload" variable="output"><bpel:query
odebpelc:lineno="61" queryLanguage="urn:oasis:names:tc:wsbpel:20:sublang:xpath10">tns:
result</bpel:query></bpel:to></bpel:copy></bpel:assign>
32. <bpel:reply name="ReplyError" odebpelc:lineno="61" operation="process"
partnerLink="client" portType="tns:process" variable="output"/></bpel:sequence>
33. </bpel:if>
34. EndBehavior
35.
36. Before
37. Invoke <BuyItems>
38. BeginBehavior
39. <!-Accessed by the manager, supervisor, employee and client-->
40. ...
41. EndBehavior
42.
43. Before
44. Invoke <RequestShipment>
45. BeginBehavior
46. <!-Accessed by the manager, supervisor, employee and client-->
47. ...
48. EndBehavior
49. EndAspect
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 Figure 12: OPS Secure BPEL Process
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Chapter 4
Extended XACML-AspectBPEL
Approach for Composite Web Services
Security
4.1 Introduction
Many literatures have emerged in the domain of web services security and led to the formu-
lation of standard languages for message-level and transport level security for web services.
However, few of the work dedicated in this domain tackled the need for process-level se-
curity. In this paper, we propose a new approach towards the integration of process-level
security for composite web services. It is based on a synergy between XACML (eXten-
sible Access Control Markup Language) security policies, Aspect-Oriented Programming
(AOP) and composition of web services (BPEL). Our approach allows first to specify the
XACML security policies, that are used to determine pointcuts in a BPEL process where
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security is needed. Subsequently, a BPEL flow with the needed security is generated into
security AspectBPEL aspects to be weaved in the aforementioned process. Our approach
consists of a dynamic integration of process-level security using a separate trust authority
and an integration of security AspectBPEL at selective join points in a process.
The main added value to the proposed framework are :
1. Avoid activity-based security and replace it with a process-level security.
2. Identify selective joint-points for the integration of security aspects in order to avoid
unnecessary calls to the XACML components.
3. Describe the security policies using a standard policy language (XACML).
4. Generate BPEL aspects conformed with XACML policies.
To demonstrate the feasibility of our proposition, we have developed a Flight Reserva-
tion System (FS) that is composed of several web services. A RBAC (Role Based Access
Control) model for the flight reservation system, which we called RBAC-FS, is elaborated
and we specified its security requirements using XACML. Afterwards, the web services
that implement the security features are developed. Then, the BPEL aspects that integrate
the security functionalities into the BPEL process are generated automatically using the
elaborated framework and weaved using our compiler introduced in [24]. The devised
XACML policies and their corresponding aspects and provide authentication and access
control features to the flight reservation system. Case studies and experimental results are
presented to defend our propositions.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 is devoted to the description
of the flight reservation architecture. In Section 4.3, we present the RBAC-FS model of
the flight reservation system. Section 4.4 is dedicated to the illustration of the proposed
approach. In Section 4.5 we present our approach’s design and implementation. In Section
4.6, we illustrate the implementation of our propositions in a case study. Finally, we give
some concluding remarks in Section 4.7.
4.2 Illustrative Example: Flight Reservation System
In this section, we describe the architecture of the flight system Web services and their
corresponding BPEL process.
4.2.1 Flight System Overview
Figure 14 explores the interactions between the user, the BPEL process and the Web ser-
vices of the flight system. As depicted in the figure, the security features are deployed on
the Web services side (i.e, not in the BPEL process). This clearly shows that any changes
in these security features need a modification in the corresponding Web service.
Our Flight System is mainly composed of three separate Web services, a BPEL process
and a graphical user interface that allows the user to request information about the Flight
agency staff, get available flights and its monthly revenues, and make a reservation. The
system available services are shown in the system main page. First, the financial data
service allows the user to request the revenues and expenses of the flight agency for a given
month. Second, the Flight Inquiry service returns a list of the available flights including the
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Figure 14: FS Architecture
time and date of the departure and arrival plus the name of the airline, and the available seats
and tickets price. The Employee Information Service allows the user to view information
about the flight system staff by entering their ID number. This information includes the
employee’s full name, phone number, email address, post and his office number. Finally,
the Make reservation Service enables the user to reserve a seat on a certain flight. All users
who can access the system have records in the database. In other words, each user has an
ID and a Password stored in the database, in addition to his/her personal information. Each
time a user wishes to access one of the flight system services, both the authentication and
access control services are invoked to ensure that he/she is not only a valid user, but he/she
also has the permission to view the requested information.
4.2.2 BPEL Process Architecture
Figure 15 illustrates a part of the the architecture of the BPEL process of our flight system.
For space restriction, the figure only explores one service invoked from the BPEL process.
We called this Web service AnyFSWebService. This Web service may or may not run
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with security on the side. The process is invoked when the user requests one of the services
offered by theWeb service. Then, the process assigns the input to the FlightService Request
message. Afterwards, the latter calls the appropriate operation of the requested service and
returns the needed info. Finally, theWeb Service response message is assigned to the BPEL
process output variable and then forwarded to the client.
Figure 15: FS BPEL Process
4.3 RBAC-FS: AnAuthorizationModel for a Flight-System
Web Services
In this section, we focus on describing the RBAC-FS model of our flight system. The
different roles that the FS model adopts are identical to that of the online purchase system
presented in section 3.6, thus we will only present the User-Role Assignment Relation
depicted in table 3.
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Table 3: RBAC-FS Role Hierarchy
R
Manager {Employment= Manager, GetFinancialData, GetEmployeeInfo, GetFinancialInquiries }
Supervisor {Employment= Supervisor, GetEmployeeInfo, GetFinancialInquiries}
Employee {Employment= Employee, GetFinancialInquiries}
Client {Employment= None, MakeReservation}
4.4 Approach Description and Architecture
Our proposed approach is based on a synergy between XACML, Aspect-Oriented Program-
ming (AOP) and composition of web services. XACML [23], in addition to other standard
languages [8, 19], are very useful for the organized description of complex and composed
security policies. They allow to avoid the ad-hoc description of security rules and specify
them in XML-based document(s).
The motivation behind the need for a process-level security is to replace the monop-
olization of web services security by placing it at the BPEL side. This shift will reduce
the overhead imposed by restricting security checks at individual invoke activities. More-
over, placing security at the BPEL side requires knowledge of the web services’s security
requirements, which is practically unavailable.Thus we have accommodated our approach
with a trust authority where each partner web service can securely place their security poli-
cies and allow the process to manage security at its side. In addition, we have consolidated
our approach with a systematic mechanism of integration of security by identifying se-
lective join points where security needs to be integrated, rather than a dogmatic call for
security at each invoke activity.
To better illustrate the importance of process-level security let’s consider our Flight
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System illustrated in Figure 14 and let’s consider a process where a leader would want to
do a check on the monthly sales then check the flight inquiries to make sure that the sales
match with the amount of tickets sold for this month. In this case, the Flight Reservation
process will consists of a sequence of two web services invoke: First, the process will
invoke the Financial Data web service to retrieve the sales figure of the current month and
then it will invoke the flight inquires web service to retrieve the amount of tickets sold.
The retrieved information will either be used by the leader to manually ensure that the
sales figure matches with the amount of tickets sold, or it will be directed to an automated
function to do the required check.
As the process invokes the financial data web service, it will have to go through this
service’ policy enforcement point to check whether this user has the right to access the
requested data. Once the request for access is identified, the process flow will resume and
another access to the policy enforcement point of the flight inquires web service is needed
to check whether that same user has access to the requested resource. A closer look to this
flow shows the overhead due to the need of security checks at each web service invoke.
Our suggested approach is depicted in Figure 16. The problem consists of moving
security from the web service side to the BPEL side in case of composite web services.
However, each web service will keep its individual XACML structure to serve requests
from other clients that are not directed through the BPEL process. Our approach consists
of having each web service deploys its XACML policy at a single Trust enforcer’s pol-
icy administration point. The trust enforcer adopts an XACML infrastructure to enforce
security at the BPEL level. Alternatively, The web services could provide their security
requirements to the BPEL provider to construct these requirements into a single policy to
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be deployed at the BPEL’s policy enforcement point. The trust enforcer through its access
to the XACML policies will generate AspectBPEL aspects for selective join points in the
BPEL process where security is needed.When the BPEL process receives a request, it di-
rects it to the trust enforcer that will launch the chain of calls to the 4 components of the
XACML structure in Figure 16. As a result, it either grants access to the service or returns
an "access denied" message to the user.
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Info 
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Figure 16: Approach Schema
Selective join points are the locations identified in the BPEL process where security
is required. These locations are found by parsing the XACML policies and matching re-
sources and actions in these policies to invoke activities in the BPEL Process. The advan-
tages of this approach is to avoid security checks on invoke activities where security isn’t
required and directing the request immediately to the corresponding service.The need to
update the selective join points is only required when the BPEL process’s sequence flow
changes and/or the web services’s security requirements change.
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To better illustrate the selection of join points consider the XACML policy presented in
Listing 4.1 and 4.2.
The permission to get current month sales rule indicates that a leader is allowed access
to the FinancialDataWS to get the Current month sales. Since there are specific authenti-
cation requirements enforced, this rule will be translated into an AspectBPEL aspects that
will be weaved accordingly before the invoke of the Financial Data web service to access
the current month sales resources.
On the other hand, the Permission to get the login window does not enforce a need
for authentication nor access control and thus this activity is not considered among the
selective joint point and will be processed directly.
4.5 Approach Design and Implementation
In the previous chapter, we introduced an approach for dynamic enforcement of composite
web services security. The feasibility of our approach was demonstrated by the implemen-
tation of a framework that enables the dynamic integration of security aspects in BPEL.
We also showed that our framework supports BPEL modularity for separation of crosscut-
ting concerns, in particular between the business and security aspects of BPEL. Moreover,
we demonstrated its ability to modify BPEL processes in a dynamic and modular fashion
without the need to go back to the BPEL code and manually add or edit activities.
In this chapter, we will present, an extension to our approach that allows the integration
of security in BPEL using XACML as a standard policy language. In this context, we will
present the structure of our XACML-AspectBPEL platform that is integrated at the Trust
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enforcer side for identification of selective join points and generation of the corresponding
Security AspectBPEL aspects to be weaved at the BPEL side.
The structure of our XACML-AspectBPEL framework is illustrated in figure 17
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Figure 17: Approach Schema
4.5.1 XACML-AspectBPEL Generator
Our XACML parser is developed in Java language based on the DOM parser for xml. It
begins by parsing the all the resources identified and actions presented in the policy. Each
action on a resource is matched to an invoke activity in the BPEL process side.
For each of the identified location, that were elected to be among the selective join
points, an AspectBPEL aspect is generated for each identified location with a call to the
Trust Enforcer enclosed within the AspectBehavior tag. The call to the trust enforcer in-
cludes information about which action and which resource the user wants to access. If the
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user is granted access, the process flow resumes normally, else it returns an error message
to the user indicating that he doesn’t have the right to access the requested resource.
4.5.2 AspectBPEL Compiler/Weaver
In order to weave the generated AspectBPEL aspects into the specified BPEL process,
we used the AspectBPEL compiler and weaver that we presented in the previous chapter.
First, the compiler will parse through the generated aspect to ensure that there are no syntax
errors. Next, our AspectBPEL weaver will parse through the join points in order to define
the activities where the behavioral BPEL code will be inserted.
Figure 18 shows three snapshots of our XACML-AspectBPEL weaver. Snapshot 1,
shows the framework with an opened XACML Policy. In snapshot 2, shows that upon
the selection of the "Generate BPEL Aspects" option, the framework will ask to specify
the BPEL process to which the aspect will be weaved. Snapshot 3 shows the generated
AspectBPEL aspects.
4.6 Case Study: Dynamic Enforcement of the RBAC-FS
Model in the FS
In this section, we present the implementation of the RBAC-FS model that illustrates all
the procedures and mechanisms described in our proposed approach for the systematic
enforcement of security at the process-level.
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4.6.1 RBAC-FS XACML Specification
Listing 4.1 and Listing 4.2 outlines a summary of the XACML-based access control pol-
icy for the flight reservation system. Due to space limitation, we included in the listing
all the roles and permissions of the FS, but we only elaborated on the GetFlightInquiries
from line 71 to line 98 and the GetMonthlySales permissions from line 33 to line 60. The
others are set in similar way. First, the roles are defined. A general role (root of the hi-
erarchy) is denoted by Leader and has 2 sub-roles, Manager and Supervisor. The leader
is given permission to perform any action to any resource. The Manager and Supervisor
roles have Staff as common sub-role and are assigned respectively to PPS:manager:role
and PPS:supervisor:role policies. The staff role has PPS:staff:role as policy. Each of the
permission policies defines the set of permissions related to each role. For instance, the
PPS:supervisor:role includes viewing each staff’s tasks list.
4.6.2 BPEL Aspects Realizing the RBAC-FS
In what follows, we will show the generated XACML-AspectBPEL aspects realizing the
aforementioned XACML policy of the RBAC-FS model. Please note that the syntax and
constructs of the aspects are specified in AspectBPEL language. Our ApsectBPEL frame-
work will compile the aspects. If an error was found, it will return an error message , else it
will indicate that the compilation was successful and then weave that latter to the specified
BPEL process. Our approach has been tested and we were successfully able to integrate
security features into a BPEL process.
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Listing 4.1: Excerpt of XACML Policy for FS-Part I
[1]. <PolicySet>
[2]. <!--Permission To Get-Login-Window-->
[3]. <Policy>
[4]. <Rule RuleId="Permission:to:Login" Effect="Permit">
[5]. <Target>
[6]. <Subjects>
[7]. <AnySubject/>
[8]. </Subjects>
[9]. <Resources>
[10]. <Resource>
[11]. <ResourceMatch MatchId="function:string-equal">
[12]. <AttributeValue DataType="xml:string">LoginWindow</AttributeValue>
[13]. <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="resource:resource-id" DataType="
xml:string"/>
[14]. </ResourceMatch>
[15]. </Resource>
[16]. </Resources>
[17]. <Actions>
[18]. <Action>
[19]. <ActionMatch MatchId="function:string-equal">
[20]. <AttributeValue DataType="xml:string">Login</AttributeValue>
[21]. <ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="action:action-id" DataType="xml:
string"/>
[22]. </ActionMatch>
[23]. </Action>
[24]. </Actions>
[25]. </Target></Rule></Policy>
[26]. <!--Defining the role policy set for the Manager-->
[27]. <!--Role policy set for the Manager-->
[28]. ...
[29]. <!--Permissions policy set for the Manager-->
[30]. ...
[31]. <!--Permission to Get-Monthly-Sales-->
[32]. <Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" PolicyId="RPS:Manager:
role" PolicyCombiningAlgId="policy-combine:permit-overrides">
[33]. <Rule RuleId="Permission:To:Get:Monthly:Sales" Effect="Permit">
[34]. <Target>
[35]. <Subjects>
[36]. <Subject>
[37]. <SubjectMatch MatchId="function:string-equal">
[38]. <AttributeValue DataType="xml:string">Manager</AttributeValue>
[39]. <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="subject:role-id" DataType="xml:string
"/>
[40]. </SubjectMatch>
[41]. </Subject>
[42]. </Subjects>
[43]. <Resources>
[44]. <Resource>
[45]. <ResourceMatch MatchId="function:string-equal">
[46]. <AttributeValue DataType="xml:string">FinancialData</AttributeValue>
[47]. <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="resource:resource-id" DataType="
xml:string"/>
[48]. </ResourceMatch>
[49]. </Resource>
[50]. </Resources>
[51]. <Actions>
[52]. <Action>
[53]. <ActionMatch MatchId="function:string-equal">
[54]. <AttributeValue DataType="xml:string">GetMonthlySales</AttributeValue>
[55]. <ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="action:action-id" DataType="xml:
string"/>
[56]. </ActionMatch>
[57]. </Action>
[58]. </Actions>
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Listing 4.2: Excerpt of XACML Policy for FS-Part II
[59]. </Target>
[60]. </Rule>
[61]. <!--Include permissions of Manager, Supervisor, Employee and Client roles-->
[62]. </Policy>
[63].
[64]. <!--Defining the role policy set for the Employee-->
[65]. <!--Role policy set for the Employee-->
[66]. ...
[67]. <!--Permissions policy set for the Employee-->
[68]. ...
[69]. <!--Permission to Get-Flight-Inquiries-->
[70]. <Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" PolicyId="RPS:Manager
:role" PolicyCombiningAlgId="policy-combine:permit-overrides">
[71]. <Rule RuleId="Permission:To:Get:Flight:Inquiries" Effect="Permit">
[72]. <Target>
[73]. <Subjects>
[74]. <Subject>
[75]. <SubjectMatch MatchId="function:string-equal">
[76]. <AttributeValue DataType="xml:string">Manager</AttributeValue>
[77]. <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="subject:role-id" DataType="xml:
string"/>
[78]. </SubjectMatch>
[79]. </Subject>
[80]. </Subjects>
[81]. <Resources>
[82]. <Resource>
[83]. <ResourceMatch MatchId="function:string-equal">
[84]. <AttributeValue DataType="xml:string">FlightInquiries</AttributeValue>
[85]. <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="resource:resource-id" DataType="xml:
string"/>
[86]. </ResourceMatch>
[87]. </Resource>
[88]. </Resources>
[89]. <Actions>
[90]. <Action>
[91]. <ActionMatch MatchId="function:string-equal">
[92]. <AttributeValue DataType="xml:string">GetMonthlyFlightInquiries</
AttributeValue>
[93]. <ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="action:action-id" DataType="xml:
string"/>
[94]. </ActionMatch>
[95]. </Action>
[96]. </Actions>
[97]. </Target>
[98]. </Rule>
[99]. <!--Include permissions of Client roles-->
[100]. </Policy>
[101].
[102]. <!--Defining the role policy set for the Supervisor-->
[103]. <!--Role policy set for the Supervisor-->
[104]. ...
[105]. <!--Permissions policy set for the Supervisor-->
[106]. ...
[107]. <!--Permission to Get-Employee-Tasks-Lists-->
[108]. ...
[109]. <!--Include permissions of Employee and Client roles-->
[110].
[111]. <!--Defining the role policy set for the Client-->
[112]. <!--Role policy set for the Client-->
[113]. ...
[114]. <!--Permissions policy set for the Client-->
[115]. ...
[116]. <!--Permission to Make-Reservation-->
[117]. </PolicySet>
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Generated BPEL Aspect for Access Control of FS Services
Listing 4.3 illustrates an excerpt of the generated aspect that realize the XACML policy
of Listing 4.1 and Listing 4.2. Due to space limitation, we will only show the XACML-
AspectBPEL aspects generated for one sequence flow of the entire BPEL Process that we
have already described in Section 4.4. This flow allows a leader to get the current monthly
sales and the flight inquiries to make sure that the sales match with the amount of tickets
sold for the current month. This process flow consists of a sequence of two web services
invoke: First, an invoke of the Financial Data web service to retrieve the sales figure of the
current month and then an invoke to the flight inquires webservice to retrieve the amount of
tickets sold. The retrieved information will be either used by the leader to manually ensure
that the sales figure matches with the amount of tickets sold, or it will be directed to an
automated function to do the required check.
4.6.3 Discussion and Experimental Results
Generating the security aspects in Listing 4.3 from the XACML policy in Listing 4.1 and
4.2 , then weaving them with the BPEL process of the Flight Reservation System presented
in Figure 15, produce the secure BPEL process illustrated in Figure 19 (due to the big size
of the BPEL process, we show only one service, which we call (AnyFSWebservice). The
resulted BPEL process provides dynamic authentication and access control features for the
Flight Reservation system. The BPEL process begins by receiving the client’s input and
follows the process’s sequence flow. Once the process reaches an invoke activity (that was
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Listing 4.3: Excerpt of Generated Security BPEL Aspects
[1]. Aspect AccessControl
[2].
[3]. BeginAspect
[4].
[5]. Before
[6]. Invoke <CurrMonthSales>
[7]. BeginBehavior
[8]. <bpel:assign validate="no" name="AccessRequest">
[9]. <bpel:copy>
[10]. <bpel:from><![CDATA["GetCurrentMonthSales"]]></bpel:from>
[11]. <bpel:to variable="PEPRequest" part="parameters"></bpel:to>
[12]. </bpel:copy>
[13]. <bpel:copy>
[14]. <bpel:from><![CDATA["FinancialDataWS"]]></bpel:from>
[15]. <bpel:to part="parameters" variable="PEPRequest"></bpel:to>
[16]. </bpel:copy>
[17]. </bpel:assign>
[18].
[19]. <bpel:invoke name="TrustEnforcer" partnerLink="TrustEnforcer" operation="PEP"
portType="ns:engine" inputVariable="PEPRequest" outputVariable="PEPResponse">
[20]. </bpel:invoke>
[21]. <bpel:if name="CheckPEPResponse">
[22]. <bpel:condition><![CDATA[$PEPResponse = "Deny"]]>
[23]. </bpel:condition>
[24]. <bpel:sequence>
[25]. <bpel:assign validate="no" name="AccessDenied">
[26]. <bpel:from><![CDATA["Access Denied"]]></bpel:from>
[27]. <bpel:to part="payload" variable="output"></bpel:to>
[28]. </bpel:copy></bpel:assign>
[29]. <bpel:reply name="ReplyErrMsg" partnerLink="client" operation="process" portType="
tns:process" variable="output">
[30]. </bpel:reply></bpel:sequence></bpel:if>
[31]. EndBehavior
[32].
[33]. Before
[34]. Invoke <CurrMonthFlightInquiries>
[35]. BeginBehavior
[36]. <bpel:assign validate="no" name="AccessRequest">
[37]. <bpel:copy>
[38]. <bpel:from><![CDATA["GetCurrMonthFlightInquiries"]]></bpel:from>
[39]. <bpel:to variable="PEPRequest" part="parameters"></bpel:to>
[40]. </bpel:copy>
[41]. <bpel:copy>
[42]. <bpel:from><![CDATA["FlightInquiriesWS"]]></bpel:from>
[43]. <bpel:to part="parameters" variable="PEPRequest"></bpel:to>
[44]. </bpel:copy>
[45]. </bpel:assign>
[46].
[47]. <bpel:invoke name="TrustEnforcer" partnerLink="TrustEnforcer" operation="PEP"
portType="ns:engine" inputVariable="PEPRequest" outputVariable="PEPResponse">
[48]. </bpel:invoke>
[49]. <bpel:if name="CheckPEPResponse">
[50]. <bpel:condition><![CDATA[$PEPResponse = "Deny"]]>
[51]. </bpel:condition>
[52]. <bpel:sequence>
[53]. <bpel:assign validate="no" name="AccessDenied">
[54]. <bpel:from><![CDATA["Access Denied"]]></bpel:from>
[55]. <bpel:to part="payload" variable="output"></bpel:to>
[56]. </bpel:copy>
[57]. </bpel:assign>
[58]. <bpel:reply name="ReplyErrMsg" partnerLink="client" operation="process" portType="
tns:process" variable="output">
[59]. </bpel:reply>
[60]. </bpel:sequence>
[61]. </bpel:if>
[62]. EndBehavior
[63]. EndAspect
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among the selective join points), a call to the trust enforcer is raised in order to determine
the user’s access rights. If the access is denied, the process replies with an "access denied"
message to the client. Otherwise, the process will proceed to invoke the flight reservation
system web service AnyFSWebservice and return to the client the requested resource.
 
Figure 19: FS Secure BPEL Process
Verifying the successful integration of the RBAC-FS security features in the original
BPEL code of the flight reservation system has been performed through extensive testing.
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 Figure 20: Performance Analysis - Execution Time
Additional efforts have been spent on verifying that the original functionalities of the sys-
tem have not been altered. Also several modifications have been applied to the security
policy and reflected dynamically in the corresponding BPEL aspects. Consequently, the
modification has been applied dynamically onto the BPEL process, which demonstrates
the feasibility and appropriateness of our propositions.
To better demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach we have also conducted a per-
formance analysis. This analysis allowed us to measure the variation in the execution time
between a BPEL process with security on the web service side and a BPEL process with
security on the process level.
Figure 20 shows the variation in the process’s runtime. The process execution runtime,
has been measured upon the number of invokes that the BPEL process includes, which
reflects the number of participating web services. The higher the number of invokes are,
the bigger and more complex the BPEL process becomes. This helps demonstrate the
scalability of our approach. The execution time has been measured using the Visual Studio
Profiling Tool [7]. This tool allows us to read the running time of the process call. Due to
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the variations in the execution time of a single process call for the same number of invokes,
the average of multiple execution has been calculated to reduce the margin of deviation.
The process execution time chart shows two different lines: a process with security at
the web service side and a process with XACML-AspectBPEL security. For the sake of the
performance analysis, we built a BPEL process and augmented the number of web services
invoke at each run. In the case of security at the web service side, we have developed for
each web service an XACML policy and incorporated an XACML infrastructure to ensure
proper security as depicted in the policy. However, in the case of security at the BPEL
level, we removed the XACML components from the web service side and placed it once
at the process side, with all of the web service policies at the PAP component.
Figure20 illustrates the following results:
 A BPEL process with security implemented at the web service level runs at 3225.33
msec for 6 web services invoke, and augments to around 8000 msec for 18 web
services invoke.
 A BPEL process with security implemented at the process level runs at 2817.42 msec
for 6 web services invoke, and reaches 6521.56 msec when running a process with
18 web services invoke.
These results clearly shows that security at the process level considerably enhances the
runtime of the BPEL process.
Furthermore, wemeasured the compilation and weaving time of the XAML-AspectBPEL
framework using the Eclipse Test and Performance Tools Platform [4]. The compilation
and weaving runtime represent the time needed to weave the AspectBPEL security aspects
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Figure 21: Performance Analysis - Compilation/Weaving Time
into a BPEL process. By looking at Figure 21, we notice that the compilation and weaving
runtime are linear with respect to the size of the AspecBPEL aspect. The size of an aspect
is measured by the number of pointcuts/advices.
This performance analysis shows that with the XACML-AspectBPEL enhances the
overall runtime of the BPEL process, since it alleviate the overhead of sending the security
verification at web service side and also reduces unnecessary security checks.
4.7 Conclusion
A novel approach was proposed for the systematic enforcement of security at the process
level using a separate trust enforcer with an XACML infrastructure. Our proposition is
based on a synergy between XACML, AOP and a composition of web services. It allows
the XACML specification of policies and separation between business and security con-
cerns of composite web services, and hence developing them separately. It also allows
the modification of the web services composition at runtime and provides modularity for
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modeling cross-cutting concerns between web services. The experiments resulting from
developing the XACML policies of the RBAC-FS model, generating their corresponding
BPEL aspects, and then deploying them in the BPEL process of the flight reservation sys-
tem, demonstrate the feasibility and appropriateness of our proposition. We also illus-
trate the successful dynamic integration and modification of access control features in the
flight reservation system. Furthermore, we conducted a thorough performance analysis to
demonstrate the efficiency of our approach and its scalability for long and complex pro-
cesses.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Web services is a new paradigm based on distributed computing, and one of the most
adopted standards that supports on-demand services. With this new technology comes new
concerns. This thesis offers a multi-layer framework that address few concerns related to
web services composition. The first part of the thesis was dedicated to the description of our
AspectBPEL framework and language. Although Several standards have been employed
to implement security at the web service side, these standards does not address the related
problems at the process level and poses a lot of overhead in the SOAP messages, and this
overhead is particularly exhibited in composite web services. Thus, the second part of our
thesis was dedicated to the elaboration of a new approach for security in composite web
services.
Thus, the main contributions of our thesis are:
1. Providing a language and a framework that is fully operational and compatible with
any BPEL process regardless of the adopted development environments (e.g., Eclipse,
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NetBeans, Oracle).
2. Describe the security policies using a standard policy language (XACML) and gen-
erate BPEL aspects conformed with these XACML policies.
3. Providing modularity for modeling security cross-cutting concerns betweenWeb ser-
vices.
4. Reducing as much as possible the security verification at the web services side, and
centralizing them at the BPEL side. This provides better performance as explored in
our experimental results.
5. Allowing the systematic and selective modification of web services compositions to
integrate, remove and/or update security mechanisms.
6. Separating the business and security concerns of composite web services, and hence
developing them separately.
5.1 Future Work
Currently, we are working on elaborating an approach for predicting the user’s access rights
through the entire process from one path to the XACML structure. As challenging as it is,
we see a lot of potentials in this approach since our parser and trust enforcer have access to
both the policies and the process. Thus with the right algorithm and methodology, we can
equip our trust enforcer with the ability to predict the access rights of each user.
Furthermore, we will adopt the eclipse development platform in order to provide our
AspectBPEL framework as a plugin in eclipse. Providing our framework as a plugin will
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offer the entire BPEL community with a new approach for developing their business pro-
cesses and it will allow the separation between business aspect of the process and other
non-functional requirements.
5.2 List of Publications
The following is the list of publications derived from the thesis work:
Conference Papers
 Azzam Mourad, Hadi Otrok, Sara Ayoubi. "Toward Systematic Integration of Secu-
rity Policies into Web Services". In the Proceedings of the European Intelligence and
Security Informatics Conference, EISIC 2011, Athens, Greece, September 12-14,
2011, IEEE.
 Azzam Mourad, Sara Ayoubi, Hamdi Yahyawi and Hadi Otrok. "New Approach
for the Dynamic Enforcement of Web Services Security". In the Proceedings of the
Eighth Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2010, Ottawa, ON,
Canada, August 17-19, 2010, IEEE.
Submitted Papers
 Azzam Mourad, Sara Ayoubi and Hadi Otrok. S¸A Novel Aspect-Oriented BPEL
Framework for the Dynamic Enforcement of Web Services SecurityTˇ, to the IEEE
Transactions on Services Computing, 2011.
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 Sara Ayoubi, Azzam Mourad, Hadi Otrok. S¸New XACML-AspectBPEL Approach
for Composite Web Services SecurityTˇ, in the Computers & Security Journals, Else-
vier, 2012.
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